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Abstract  
This paper proposes a strategic framework for policies to assist smallholders in developing 
countries. It describes the inevitable features of structural change in the agricultural and rural 
economy,  the  associated  pressures  that  these  changes  place  on  smallholders,  and  the 
consequent need for policies to facilitate rather than impede adjustment. A key premise of the 
framework is that, for  the  majority  of smallholders, the long term (i.e. inter-generational) 
future lies outside the sector. Hence, long-term policies need to make a distinction between 
those who potentially have a competitive future in the sector and those who do not. In either 
case, many of the necessary policies will not be agriculture-specific, so it is important that 
agricultural policies are framed in a broader economy-wide framework. In addition, a clear 
distinction  needs  to  be  made  between  short-term  policies  to  reduce  poverty  and  food 
insecurity and long-term policies to stimulate development. This is because there are inter-
temporal  trade-offs  (as  well  as  complementarities)  between  policies  that  are  likely  to  be 
effective in the short-run, and those promising most impact over the long-term. The paper 
discusses  the  role  of  different  agricultural  and  non-agricultural  policies  in  providing  the 
appropriate policy mix in countries at different stages of development. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The first Millennium Development Goal (MDG1) calls for the eradication of extreme poverty and 
hunger, with a specific target of halving between 1990 and 2015 the proportion of people living on less 
than a dollar a day. The world as a whole may achieve this target, thanks primarily to rapid income growth 
in East Asia (and China in particular). But in many parts of the world, progress has been weak or non-
existent. Using a recently updated income benchmark of USD 1.25 per day, the number of poor is actually 
increasing in Africa and South Asia (Chen and Ravallion, 2008). Between 1981 and 2005, the incidence of 
poverty in South Asia fell from almost 60% to 40%, but because of population growth that was not enough 
to bring down the numbers of poor. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the situation was even worse: the incidence of 
poverty was virtually unchanged between 1981 and 2005, at around 50%, which implied that the number 
of  poor  almost  doubled from  214 million  to  over  390 million.  By  this  measure,  Africa’s  share  of  the 
world’s poor increased from 11% in 1981 to 28% in 2005. Some modest signs of progress in recent years 
(since 2000) were arrested by the recent increase in world food prices, which the World Bank estimated 
was severe enough to throw another 100 million people into poverty (Ivanic and Martin, 2008). Prices have 
since fallen back, but remain considerably higher than they were in the first part of the decade. 
If broader based progress on MDG1 is to be achieved, then average incomes will need to increase 
much more rapidly in the next five years than they have done in the past twenty. Given that three quarters 
of the world’s dollar a day poor live in rural areas (corresponding to 880 million people), and most depend 
on agriculture for their livelihoods, there is a particular need for faster development of rural incomes. This 
in  turn  requires  carefully  thought  out  agricultural  and  rural  development  policies,  and  a  specific 
consideration of what to do about smallholders, who form the backbone of developing country agriculture. 
The importance of faster agricultural and rural development has been recognised by policymakers. In 
the case of Africa, for example, the African Union’s 2003 Common African Agricultural Development 
Programme (CAADP) framework sets a target of 6% for agricultural growth, while under the 2003 Maputo 
Declaration its members are committed to allocate at least 10% of public expenditure to agriculture and 
rural development. On the donor side, the G8 pledged in 2008 to provide EUR 1 billion of support for 
investment in African agriculture. 
The food price crisis has also led to international commitments to allocate more money to agriculture. 
The World Food Programme appealed for additional funds and had received more than USD 1 billion by 
the end of 2008; the World Bank launched a $1.2 billion Global Food Crisis Response Program in mid 
2008; and the FAO presented a USD 1.7 billion Initiative on Soaring Food Prices in June 2008 (Abbott, 
2009).  Bilateral  donor  countries  also  pledged  additional  resources  to  address  problems  in  developing 
countries stemming from the food crisis (GDPRD, 2009). As food prices have fallen back, the legacy of 
the crisis has been that it has drawn attention to the deeper need for short, mid and long-term measures to 
tackle food insecurity and poverty. The UN High-Level Task Force on the Food Security Crisis advocated 
a  two  pronged  approach,  focusing  on  emergency  relief  and  renewed  efforts  to  invest  in  agricultural 
development, with a particular emphasis on supporting smallholder agriculture. With prices now lower 
(albeit still above average levels over the past ten years), the emphasis has shifted to the chronic lack of 
smallholder development, with strong support for so-called “smart” subsidies for seed and fertiliser. 
The purpose of this discussion paper is to give consideration to what constitutes an effective strategy 
for smallholders in countries at various stages of development, both in the short term in terms of reducing 
poverty and hunger (or constraining increases that would flow from adverse shocks) and over the longer 
term, in terms of promoting economic development and wider employment opportunities. The main thesis 
is that while there are some instruments that can be beneficial irrespective of the time horizon, there are   3 
nevertheless  difficult trade-offs  between  short  and  long  term  priorities,  and  a  strategic  framework  for 
smallholder development needs to acknowledge those trade-offs.
1 
It is important to  define  at the outset what we mean by smallholders. Here the term  is taken as 
shorthand for farm households which struggle to be competitive, either because their endowments of assets 
compare unfavourably with those of more efficient producers in the economy or because they confront 
missing or under-developed markets. A limiting factor may be insufficient farm size, although other assets, 
such as farm management skills may also be lacking. It is important to note that what constitutes a small 
farm may differ markedly from one country to the next. For example, the average farm size in many Asian 
countries is less than a hectare, whereas much larger operations in Latin America may be considered as 
small. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the broad experience 
across  countries of agricultural development  and structural  change.  This helps provide  context on the 
evolving role of smallholders in the economy, and points to some principles that need to guide policy 
formulation.  Section  3  contrasts  those  principles  with  actual  agricultural  policies  and  approaches  to 
smallholder  development.  Section  4 proposes a  strategic framework  for  smallholder  adjustment  which 
seeks  to  reconcile  the  short  run  objective  of  poverty  alleviation  with  the  long-run  aim  of  facilitating 
development. Section 5 presents some conclusions and identifies some priorities for further policy analysis. 
 
2.  STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN THE RURAL ECONOMY 
The process of economic development is characterised by three main empirical regularities that are of 
relevance  when  considering  the  strategic  options  for  smallholder  development.  These  are  the  sectoral 
transition away from an economic structure based on agriculture to one dominated by manufactures and 
services, the spatial tendency towards increased urbanisation, and an institutional transformation from an 
economy based largely on informal rules to one based on formal legislation (Jonasson, 2009). In its 2008 
World Development Report, the World Bank makes a distinction between agriculture-based, transforming 
and urbanised economies that captures the first two elements of this economic transformation.
2 Countries 
tend to move through these categories, although they may experience short cuts in the process, such as 
learning from policy experiences in urbanised economies, or take detours due to such factors as civil war, 
corrupt government or a misallocation of public resources. These changes have important implications for 
the design of agricultural and rural policies. 
 
                                                       
1  The  paper  builds  on  an  earlier  paper  by  Cervantes-Godoy  and  Brooks  (2008),  which  considers  the  issue  of 
smallholder adjustment in middle income countries. 
2 According to this classification, agriculture-based economies are those in which agriculture contributes 20% or more 
to overall economic growth; transforming economies are those in which agriculture contributes less than 20% to total 
growth yet 60% or more of the country’s poor live in rural areas; while urbanised economies are those in which 
agriculture contributes less than 20% to overall growth and less than 60% of the poor live in rural areas. More than 
80% of the rural poor in Sub-Saharan Africa live in agriculture-based countries, while over 90% of the poor in Asia, 
the  Middle-East  and  North  Africa  live  in  transforming  economies.  A  majority  of  Latin  America’s  poor  live  in 
urbanised countries, although nearly one-half of the poor still live in rural areas. There are virtually no countries 
where agriculture contributes more than 20% to growth but in which the numbers of urban poor exceed the numbers 
of rural poor. Among developing countries, there is a strong correspondence between these three categories and three 
income classes for countries (low income, lower-middle income and upper-middle income) also specified by the 
World Bank.   4 
2.1. The sectoral transformation 
The  sectoral  changes  associated  with  economic  development  are  evident  from  the  cross-country 
relationship between agriculture’s share of GDP and GDP per capita. Figure 1 provides a scatter plot of 
these two indicators for 180 countries in 2005. For countries with a GDP per capita of USD 2 000 or less 
(approximately 7.5 on the logarithmic scale), it is  still not uncommon for agriculture to constitute 30 
percent or more of the economy. As per capita income rises above USD 10 000, practically no country has 
an agricultural sector that accounts for more than 10 percent of GDP. 
Figure 1. Share of agriculture in GDP and per-capita GDP. 
 
      Note:  180  countries;  GDP  per  capita  refers  to  2005  PPP  USD.  Source:  World  Development 
Indicators, 2009. 
The change in employment patterns largely mirrors this transformation. Figure 2 shows the average 
shares of employment in agriculture, manufacturing, and services for 120 countries, divided into seven 
income categories. On average, half of the labour force in the poorest countries is occupied in agriculture. 
This share falls quickly with income, and for countries that have a per-capita income of USD 15 000 or 
higher, the service sector generally occupies two-thirds or more of the labour force, manufacturing most of 
the remainder, and agriculture just a few percent.   5 
Figure 2. Employment shares in agriculture, manufacturing, and services  
 
      Note: 120 countries; income categories are based on GDP per capita 2005, PPP USD. 
      Source: Author’s calculations based on World Development Indicators, 2009. 
Further insights are apparent from the historical experiences of a more limited group of transforming 
and urbanised economies. Figure 3 shows how agriculture’s share of GDP changed between 1961 and 
2005,  with  countries  ordered  according  to  their  GDP  per  capita.  The  graph  re-emphasises  the  strong 
inverse correlation between agriculture’s share of GDP and GDP per capita, with high income OECD 
countries typically having no more than 2%-3% of GDP generated by their farm sectors. A second, and 
consistent, feature is that agriculture’s share of GDP has declined in all countries, including those with a 
strong comparative advantage in agricultural activities. A third point is that the decline of the share of 
resources in agriculture has been larger for countries with lower incomes, which have more scope for 
agricultural  productivity  improvements  and  for  shifting  resources  into  new  non-farm  activities  (in 
developed countries, that shift has already occurred).
3 
                                                       
3 There are some exceptions, such as Brazil and Chile, where the changes have been large in absolute terms, but low 
relative to other countries at similar income levels. In these particular countries, import substitution industrialisation 
policies led to a rapid growth in manufacturing prior to the base year, bringing down agriculture’s share of GDP; 
while more recently the liberalisation of policies has mitigated the tendency of resources to shift out of agriculture, as 
these countries have exploited their natural comparative advantage in agricultural activities.   6 
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Source: FAO (1999); WDI (2008); IMF (2008). 
Similar patterns are observed when one looks at the evolution of agriculture’s share of employment 
over  the  same  period  (Figure 4).  A  key  feature  here  is  that,  for  most  middle  income  (transforming) 
countries, the decline in agriculture’s share of employment has been more rapid than the fall in the sector’s 
share  of  GDP,  reflecting  stronger  gains  in  labour  productivity  than  in  other  sectors.  Also,  whereas 
agriculture’s  share  of  GDP  has  fallen  substantially  for  nearly  all  developing  countries,  the  labour 
adjustment has been larger for middle income countries than for lower income countries such as India. The 
reason here would appear to be that while non-agriculture’s share of GDP is rising across countries, it is in 
the middle income (transforming and urbanised) countries that alternative employment possibilities have 
become more widely available and the transition of labour out of semi-subsistence farming has really got 
underway.   7 
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Source: FAO (1999); WDI (2008); IMF (2008). 
What is clear is that, once the sectoral transformation is underway, its pace is more rapid than in the 
past (Table 1). Whereas it took a century or more for agriculture’s share of GDP to fall from 40% to 7% in 
OECD countries that went through the industrial revolution early, middle income countries are effecting 
these changes in three decades or less. This accelerating change is matched by a rapid release of labour out 
of the sector. In Korea,  agriculture’s  share  of  employment  fell  from  40% to 16% in just  14 years – a 
transition which took 53 years in the United States and 68 years in the United Kingdom (the first country to 
go through the industrial revolution).   8 
Table  1. Pace of adjustment in various countries, based on agriculture share of GDP and 
employment 
Agriculture share of GDP  Agriculture share of employment   
Year of 
40% 
Year of 7%  Years 
required 
Year of 40%  Year of 16%  Years 
required 
Netherlands  1800  1965  165  1855  1957  102 
Denmark  1850  1969  119  1920  1962  42 
UK  1788  1901  113  1800  1868  68 
Chile  1875  1980  105  1950  1993  43 
Mexico  1890  1992  102  1969  2000  31 
USA  1854  1950  96  1897  1950  53 
France  1878  1972  94  1921  1965  44 
Brazil  1910  2003  93  1960  2005 
(20.5%) 
>45 
Germany  1866  1958  92  1900  1942  42 
Japan  1896  1969  73  1940  1971  31 
Poland  1935  1991  56  1968  2006 
(18.7%)  
>31 
India  1962  2006 (17.5%)  >44  2005 (58%)    -- 
China  1967  2006 (11.7%)  >39  2006 (43%)    -- 
Turkey  1970  2007 (8.9%)  >37  1998  2007 
(28.7%) 
>9 
Korea  1965  1991  26  1977  1991  14 
Indonesia  1971  1997  26  2006 (42%)    -- 
Source: Adapted from Kim, H. and Lee, Y.K. (2003). 
The reasons for agriculture’s declining relative economic importance are well documented (for an 
overview, see Timmer, 1998). On the demand side, income elasticities of demand for food tend to be less 
than for other consumption so that the demand for food does not grow as fast as demand for other goods. 
On the supply side, total factor productivity typically rises faster in agriculture than in other sectors of the 
economy  (Martin  and  Mitra,  2001).  Moreover,  technical  innovation  associated  with  agricultural 
productivity growth is labour saving, which has permitted the reduction of the share of labour devoted to 
production  (Johnson, 2000).  These  combined  developments  permit the  release of resources,  especially 
labour, to other sectors. In absolute terms, the agricultural sector may nevertheless continue to expand. The 
pressure for farm resources to shift into other sectors may be lessened by the scope for increased exports in 
countries with a comparative advantage in agricultural activities, or reinforced by pressure from imports in 
the case of countries with a comparative disadvantage. 
 
2.2. The spatial transformation 
The spatial transformation from rural to predominantly urban economic activity is not as uniform as 
the sectoral transformation. Figure 5 shows that a majority of countries with a per capita income of less 
than USD 5 000 dollars (approximately 8.5 on the logarithmic scale) have more than 50 percent of their 
population in rural areas. On average, this share declines to 25 percent when countries reach an income of 
20 000 dollars. Urbanisation may occur both as a result of higher birth rates in urban areas compared to   9 
rural areas and as a result of rural-to-urban migration.
4 In China a majority (about 56 percent) of the 
population is still rural, but rapid migration from rural areas might soon change this situation. In 1983 the 
cumulative number of rural migrants was about 2 million in China. This number had increased to about 78 
million in the year 2000. Six years later, in 2006, the estimated cumulative number of rural migrants was 
132 million (OECD, 2009). In India, which has the largest rural population in the World (approximately 
800 million), it is estimated that rural-to-urban migration accounts for about 30 percent of urbanization 
(Mitra  and  Murayama,  2008).  In  Brazil,  rapid  migration  from  rural  areas  increased  the  share  of  the 
population in urban areas from 15 percent in 1940 to 56 percent in 1970, and to more than 80 percent in 
2000 (Wagner and Ward, 1980; Brazilian Demographic Census 2000). 
Figure 5. Share of population that is rural and GDP per capita (190 countries) 
 
Note: 190 countries; GDP per capita refers to 2005 PPP USD. Source: World Development Indicators, 
2009. 
The agglomeration of human activity with economic development may be inevitable, but the specific 
character of urbanisation is not. Rural areas may become more “urbanised” as a result of the agricultural 
transformation and the induced growth in non-farm activity. Alternatively, urbanisation may result from 
poor unskilled labour migrating to cities in the anticipation of improved prospects. In the absence of a 
parallel  development  in  social  infrastructure,  the  resulting  shanty  towns  (common  in  Asia  and  Latin 
America)  may  impose  severe  social  strains.  Hence  there  is  a  need  to  plan  for  a  sustainable  form  of 
urbanisation, which is likely to require the balanced promotion of farm and non-farm opportunities in rural 
areas. 
2.3. The institutional transformation 
A  third  dimension  of  change  that  developing  countries  tend  to  go  through  is  the  institutional 
transformation  from  an  economy  based  largely  on  informal  rules  and  procedures  to  one  based  on  a 
framework of formal legislation – in short, the transformation from informal to formal institutions.
5 In the 
                                                       
4 Rural areas may grow “urban” if they reach the population threshold that defines an urban area. Thus, the rate of 
urbanization  depends  to  a  certain  degree  on  how  urban  and  rural  areas  are  defined.  Usually,  population 
agglomerations  of  5 000  people  constitute  the  lower  threshold  for  what  is  officially  defined  as  an  urban  area 
(Haggblade et al., 2007).  
5 Institutions are understood here as the ‘rules of the game’ that shape and guide human behaviour (North, 1990). The 
distinction between formal and informal lies largely in the enforcement mechanism. While formal institutions are   10 
absence of formal rules that effectively regulate employment, property ownership, or land use, various 
types  of  informal  rules  and  procedures  are  usually  applied  instead.  Two  examples  from  the  agrarian 
economy are sharecropping as a means to overcome moral hazard situations in the farmer-labourer relation 
and “squatter’s rights”, which regulate access to land. 
The strengthening of formal institutions may facilitate the emergence of more commercially oriented 
agriculture, for example by supporting the development of land rental and credit markets, and other forms 
of formal contracts. It may also make the use of certain policy instruments more feasible, such as social 
safety nets. It is thus the third element of a three-pronged strategy for smallholder development, which 
involves  facilitating  the  three  dimensions  of  structural  change:  adjustment  away  from  agriculture-
dependence, a desirable form of urbanisation and concomitant institutional development. The specifics of 
this strategy are taken up in Section 4. 
 
2.4. Where do countries stand in the transformation process? 
Three-quarters  of  the  world’s  dollar  a  day  rural  poor  (nearly  600 million  people)  live  in 
“transforming” economies, where poverty remains predominantly rural but agriculture contributes less than 
20% to overall economic growth. In these countries the agricultural transformation is well underway but 
the spatial transformation has yet to work its way through. This has two important implications: First, it 
points to the need for a rural strategy as much as an agricultural one. Second, it underlines the importance 
of not generalising from the circumstances of a few agriculture-dependent economies. Thus for example, 
while  Malawi’s  input  subsidy  programme  has  received  much  attention, it  should  be  remembered  that 
Malawi is an outlier in terms of agriculture’s contribution to GDP (nearly 60%), and the extent to which its 
poverty is rural (nearly 90%). For the majority of countries, in which the agricultural transformation has 
already gained traction, agricultural growth seldom exceeds 5% per year, whereas in manufactures and 
services growth rates of 10% or more are common. Hence, for most of the world’s poor, an appropriate 
development strategy has to focus on providing opportunities outside the farm sector at least as much as 
within it. 
 
3.  POLICY RESPONSES TO STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
Smallholders in developing countries often underpin the rural economy yet they are rarely competitive 
on a commercial basis. Moreover they face systematic adjustment pressures as a necessary corollary of the 
development process. With technology improving, and more efficient use being made of scarce resources, 
including  the  exploitation  of  scale  economies,  smallholders  that  do  not  participate  in  sectoral  cost 
improvements inevitably face pressures on their incomes. Faced with such pressures, governments have 
various options: they can shield smallholders from this pressure, or they can help them adapt to it – either 
by becoming more  competitive,  obtaining incomes  from other  sources,  or by  finding jobs  outside the 
sector. 
Governments’ approach to smallholder adjustment has varied from one country to the next, but has 
been  broadly  related  to  the  existing  level  of  development.  The  nine  emerging  economies  covered  by 
OECD’s  Monitoring and Evaluation exercise – a group which includes three OECD members (Korea, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
usually  enforced  by  official  entities  (such  as  police,  bureaucrats  and  courts),  informal  institutions  are  socially 
sanctioned norms of behaviour that rely primarily on self-enforcement mechanisms of obligation, expectations of 
reciprocity, and internalised norm adherence (de Soysa and Jütting, 2008).   11 
Mexico and Turkey) and six non-members (Brazil, Chile, China, Russia, South Africa and Ukraine) – have 
all tended to protect their agricultural sectors. However, for all countries except Korea, producer support as 
measured by the PSE has been lower than the OECD average (Figure 6). The majority of support has been 
provided through market price support, which concentrates benefits among large producers when there is a 
spread of farm sizes and tends to put a brake on the process of adjustment rather than facilitate it. 
However,  some  of  these  countries  have  also  instituted  significant  programmes  targeted  at 
smallholders. For example, both Brazil and Chile have programmes that seek to integrate smallholders into 
the commercial sector, notably via the use of subsidised credit and investments in farm-level infrastructure. 
In few cases, however, have policymakers openly acknowledged that long-term competitiveness is not a 
realistic goal for the majority of smallholders and decided to focus their programmes on potentially viable 
operations. At the same time, there is no documented case of  a smallholder programme in which the 
majority of farmers enrolling have succeeded in progressing through the programme to successfully join 
the ranks of efficient commercial producers. In other words, no programme has reversed the structural 
tendency for smallholders to leave the sector. This suggests that these policies constitute social policies at 
least as much as developmental ones. 










1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007p
%
Brazil Chile China Russia South Africa Ukraine Mexico Korea Turkey OECD Average   
Source: OECD PSE/CSE Database (2008). 
Low-income countries have historically tended to tax their agricultural sectors rather than subsidise 
them (Krueger, Schiff and Valdés, 1991). They have done this both directly, for example via export taxes 
and food subsidies, and indirectly, by investing relatively less in rural areas. Since the mid-1980s, there has 
been some reduction in this tendency, but it still prevails (Anderson et al., 2008). As incomes rise and as 
agriculture’s share of employment decreases, countries can afford more easily to provide support to their 
agricultural sectors (Figure 7). Whereas the total nominal rate of assistance (NRA), which measures the 
ratio of domestic farmgate prices to adjusted border prices, has fallen in high income countries since the 
mid  1980s,  it  has  risen  in  developing  countries.  In  the  past  ten  years,  developing  countries  have,  on   12 
average, started to subsidise their agricultural sectors rather than tax them. Some caution needs to be 
exercised  in  interpreting  these  numbers,  as  the  NRAs  are  weighted  averages  for  import-competing 
products, exportables and non-tradables, and in some cases different patterns can be observed when these 
categories are treated separately. 




















HIC & ECA* Developing countries
 
* HIC= High income countries; ECA=Eastern European and Central Asia countries. 
Source: Anderson et al. (2008). 
Figure 8 also helps to illustrate the connection between the level of protection and agriculture’s share 
of employment. The horizontal axis shows agriculture’s share of total employment, while the vertical axis 
measures the NRA. The arrows show the movement for each country between 1961 and 2005. For nearly 
all developing countries, the arrow points to the north-west, indicating an increasing rate of protection as 
labour leaves the sector, whereas the pattern for high income OECD countries is mixed.
6 The arrows are 
also much longer for developing countries, as more dramatic structural changes have taken place, and the 
associated  change  in  protection  has  been  larger.  Interestingly,  developing  countries  have  undergone 
significant adjustment, seemingly irrespective of whether the rise in protection has been large or small. 
                                                       
6 The tendency of countries to protect their agriculture as they become more developed stems from the political 
economy of structural change. On the demand side, as consumers spend a declining share of their incomes on food 
they become ‘rationally ignorant’ that they are paying elevated prices for their food – it is not worth the effort of 
becoming informed and protesting. On the supply side, the release of labour from the sector means that a given 
transfer  to  producers  imposes  a  progressively  smaller  burden  on  the  overall  economy.  Moreover,  competitive 
pressures on less efficient farmers increase their incentive to lobby for government support.   13 
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Source: Anderson et al. (2008); FAO (1999); WDI (2008). 
In low-income countries, declining dis-protection has been matched by commitments to allocate more 
resources to agricultural development. In such as context, it is important that monies are allocated wisely, 
and that the overall policy environment is conducive to agricultural development. This calls for a logical 
framework that acknowledges two important things. First, the long-term, i.e. inter-generational, future for 
the majority of smallholders cannot lie exclusively in farming; hence there is a need for policies that 
enhance households’ opportunities outside the sector as well as within it. Second, in order to improve both 
agricultural competitiveness and the prospects for earning more outside the sector, the most important 
policies may not in fact be agricultural policies. It is therefore important that smallholder policies are 
framed in an economy-wide context, with agricultural policies a component of the overall policy mix. The 
elements of an appropriate strategy are set out in the next section. 
 
4. A STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR SMALLHOLDER DEVELOPMENT 
4.1. Short-to-medium term policy considerations 
In proposing a strategic framework for smallholder development it is helpful to make a distinction 
between the short to medium term issue of how best to support incomes, reduce poverty and tackle food 
insecurity (beyond immediate questions of humanitarian relief), and deeper long term questions regarding 
how  best  to  promote  economic  development.  There  may  be  a  connection,  with  programmes  that  are 
effective in the short term sowing the seeds for longer term development, but there may equally be trade-
offs,  so  it  is  conceptually  helpful  to  keep  consider  the  issue  of  social  policy  separate  from  that  of 
development policy.   14 
The optimal way of addressing short term social objectives is with social policies. In countries with 
developed  systems  of  social  protection,  agricultural  policies  are  relatively  poor  at  providing  social 
protection.  In  the  first  place,  a  significant  share  of  the  benefits  to  farmers  from  agriculture-specific 
measures such as price supports and input subsidies “leaks” to unintended recipients such as providers of 
purchased inputs or non-farming landlords or is incurred as deadweight efficiency losses (OECD, 2003). 
Second,  the  use  of  such  instruments  typically  has  perverse  distributional  effects,  with  larger  farmers 
benefiting more than smallholders. A third reason is that it is difficult to target such measures for both 
practical  administrative  and  political  economy  reasons.  For  example,  it  is  difficult  to  restrict  price 
guarantees to smaller farmers without using a deficiency payment system (in which case other forms of 
social payment must surely be feasible), or to limit fertiliser subsidies to those who would not otherwise 
purchase fertiliser. 
Across a range of developed and developing countries, population-wide social safety nets have proven 
relatively effective at supporting the incomes of rural households. In developing countries, conditional cash 
transfers (CCTs) have become particularly popular over the past decade. These programmes transfer cash 
to generally poor households on the condition that they make pre-specified investments in the human 
capital of their children. CCTs have been found to be effective at increasing consumption levels among the 
poor, and have led to behavioural changes, although their impact on final outcomes in health and education 
has been less clear (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009). This may be due to the need for CCTs to operate in 
conjunction with complementary investments (e.g. in schools and hospitals). An issue with CCTs is when 
the “conditional” element is warranted. For example, it may not be worth incurring the monitoring and 
enforcement costs associated with the condition that parents put their children in school if they would do 
that anyway. 
In the poorest countries, however, it has been argued that the necessary institutions and infrastructure 
do not exist for cash-based instruments to be appropriate, and second-best arguments (i.e. those which 
necessitate market distortions) have been advanced to justify the use of agricultural policies such as price 
supports and input subsidies. For example, there may be no registry or information base by which to 
establish criteria of eligibility; remote farmers may not have a convenient way of spending cash; and – with 
weak institutions – such programmes may be particularly susceptible to corruption. 
The case for systemic price support is weak. Aside from the standard shortcomings of such policies 
(described above), price support is particularly ineffective in agriculture-dependent economies, as amongst 
the  poor  there  are  both  net  buyers  and  net  sellers  of  food,  and  many  (perhaps  the  majority  of)  farm 
households  may  in  fact  be  net  buyers.  However,  the  case  for  some  form  of  price  stabilisation  is 
considerably stronger. The difficulties of designing price stabilisation programmes are well known. Formal 
(ex  ante)  price  stabilisation  induces  moral  hazard,  with  agents  failing  to  mitigate  risk,  and  price 
stabilisation can easily turn into systemic price support or suppression, depending on political pressures. 
Few, if any, price stabilisation programmes have proven to be financially sustainable. Yet in the short term 
there may be no other way of containing the impact of adverse price shocks on poverty and food security 
than by seeking to offset those impacts (for example by releasing/buying stocks, or by changing tariffs). 
Indeed, ad hoc (and ex post) intervention in genuinely extreme circumstances might be the best way of 
protecting incomes while limiting the disincentives for individuals to protect themselves against risk.
  
Input subsidies have also been suggested as a way (possibly the only way) of targeting the incomes of 
poor farmers, with the attraction (when markets are insulated) of lowering prices to consumers too. A host 
of difficulties of using input subsidies have been acknowledged. The inevitability of leakages to other 
agents in the supply chain, and the difficulties of targeting have already been noted. In addition such 
measures may crowd out the development of private input markets, may lead to the over-use of inputs, and 
once  introduced  have  historically  proven  difficult  to  rescind.  Nevertheless,  there  has  been  renewed 
optimism that a new generation of so-called “smart” subsidies, by virtue of innovative design features,   15 
such as exit strategies, can deliver income benefits while limiting their known shortcomings (Dorward, 
2009). 
An additional (and sometimes dominant) argument that has been used for input subsidies, and to a 
lesser extent for price support, is that it acts as a bridge to longer term development, creating a surplus 
among farmers that can initiate the agricultural transformation. This argument, the key justification for the 
policy focus on smallholder development, starts from the premise that economic development has to start 
with improving the profitability of existing structures. 
From  a  conceptual  point  of  view,  this  argument  needs  to  be  kept  separate  from  the  short-term 
rationale  for  intervention.  Over  the  longer  term,  policymakers  need  to  consider  why  farmers  are  not 
competitive. This may be because of high transaction costs, for example due to poorly developed road 
systems, or market failures, such as the absence of functioning credit markets. The optimal policy solution 
would be to reduce transaction costs, vial suitable investments and thereby correct market failures directly 
– in other words, treat the causes of a lack of competitiveness rather than the symptoms. 
However, such structural policies take time to pay-off, so direct support for smallholder development 
(with an emphasis on input subsidies) has similarly been advanced as a second-best alternative. In the case 
of the  poorest of economies, this  second-best  component may be  part  of a  much  broader  package of 
specific help to improve farmers’ competitiveness. Ideally, long-term development policies should be able 
to discriminate between those who are potentially viable in the sector and those who are not, creating 
improved competitive conditions for the former and facilitating adjustment via diversification or exit for 
the latter. Generalised price support, or sector-wide input subsidies cannot do this. Indeed it runs the risk of 
impeding structural adjustment. 
4.2. Long-term priorities 
A  long  term  strategy  for  smallholder  development  needs  to  acknowledge  the  inevitability  of  the 
sectoral, spatial and institutional transformations that accompany economic development. This calls for an 
integrated approach that smoothes adjustment across all three dimensions by: (i) enabling smallholders to 
become competitive or boost their incomes from other sources (diversification or exit); (ii) promoting a 
broader rural development strategy that does not focus exclusively on agricultural development, but seeks 
to create a more diversified rural economy; and (iii) strengthening institutions with a view to reducing the 
need for second best instruments. 
Elements of such a strategy are set out in Table 2. Smallholder development here is understood to be 
the optimal path of adjustment to higher long-term income, be that improved competitiveness within the 
sector,  income  diversification  (from  agricultural  or  non-agricultural  sources),  or  exit  to  other  sectors. 
Adjustment pathways are described in the columns, and policy instruments in the rows. The first column 
(improving competitiveness within agriculture) applies to farm households only, but the other columns 
may  apply  to  both  farm  households  and  salaried  (often  “landless”)  worker  households.  Note  that  the 
development pathways (columns) are not mutually exclusive: for example, one household member can 
enhance the farm’s competitiveness while another provides off-farm income. Also, the instruments (rows) 
do not exhaust all possible policies, but focus on those with persuasive arguments.   16 
Table 2. Strategic framework for smallholder development 
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Improving the competitiveness of farm households 
In respect of farm households, it is important to have a realistic view of which farmers have the 
potential to succeed commercially within the sector. In some regions agro-ecological conditions may be 
such that farming may not be inherently commercially viable. More generally, the appropriate adjustment   17 
pathway may depend on the basic type of farming system. For example, in East and Southern Africa the 
scope for agricultural growth in areas where a mixed maize and cash crop system dominates is inherently 
stronger than the potential in areas where rainfed sorghum and millet combine with pastoral agriculture 
(Dixon et al., 2001). Yet even when agro-ecological conditions are inherently favourable, the nature of 
structural change is such that farm operations tend to consolidate into fewer and more efficient enterprises, 
and some farmers will leave the sector.
7 
The main role for agricultural policy would appear to be in providing public goods that can improve 
competitiveness,  but  impose  few  distortions  to  incentives  at  the  margin  (such  as  investments  in  rural 
infrastructure, skills and training, and R&D).
8 Such investments are unlikely to crowd out the development 
of  other  activities  and  potential  income  streams,  although  they  are  likely  to  accelerate  the  shake-out 
between more and less competitive farmers. Most of the relevant expenditures would need to be made at 
the  economy-wide  or  sectoral  level  rather  than  in  the  form  of  payments  to  individuals.  A  possible 
exception is when there are endemic market failures, for example in credit markets. Access to credit is 
important for smallholders, and private credit markets may find it not worth their while to engage with 
smallholders,  simply  because  of  their  size  and  the  difficulties  of  becoming  informed  about  the 
creditworthiness of many small operations. 
In  many  developing  countries  land  rental  markets  function  poorly  or  do  not  exist  at  all.  The 
development of rental contracts can help compensate for market failures, provide flexible responses to 
economic and productive incentives, allow farmers to invest in farming capital, and help the poor and 
young gain access to land under conditions that are less demanding than those required to participate in 
land sales markets. Renting land may also be a first step to future land acquisition. The underdevelopment 
of  rental  markets  may  prevent  the  consolidation  of  land  into  more  productive  units,  thus  impeding 
agricultural investment and making it more difficult for uncompetitive farmers to diversify out of the 
sector. 
Income diversification for farm households and salaried agricultural workers 
Income diversification is essential for many farm households. For the poorest farm households, this is 
likely to provide some insurance and is in effect a “coping” strategy. For other farm households, having 
one or more family members draw income from outside agriculture may be the start of a successful move 
into more remunerative activities. Policies that support farm income alone, such as market price support, 
act as a disincentive for income diversification outside agriculture, providing a further argument against 
their use. The key policies required to help households diversify their income sources are again those that 
improve human capital. Regional development policies, including the development of rural infrastructure, 
may also have an important role. 
                                                       
7 Poulton and Wiggins (2005) present some evidence of declining farm sizes in developing countries, mostly for 
countries where the average farm size is a hectare or less. This may represent a fragmentation of operations, for 
example due to inheritance laws and property rights systems, and is unlikely to be due to purported efficiencies of 
small  farms  (e.g. ease  of  labour  supervision; local knowledge)  outweighing the efficiencies  of larger operations 
(knowledge  of  markets  and  technology;  access  to  credit  and  inputs;  ease  of  risk  management;  ability  to  assure 
quality). 
8 There is evidence to suggest that improvements in agricultural productivity have a strong effect in reducing poverty 
(Irz et al., 2001). There is also evidence that agricultural growth has helped support broader economic growth (for 
example, Tiffin and Irz, 2006), although agriculture’s role as a necessary driver of development has been questioned 
(Gardner and Tsakok, 2008).   18 
Leaving the sector for skilled employment 
Ultimately, the majority of smallholders in developing countries will have stronger prospects outside 
the agricultural sector than within it. The most important need, if not for this generation then for the next, 
would therefore appear to be investment in the education and skills that would enable households to obtain 
higher wages. 
Regional development programmes may also have a role in bringing jobs to people (rather than the 
other way round) and so can prevent the problems associated with mass migration into cities. However, 
rural policies  are  not fundamentally agricultural policies  (nor vice  versa). Regional  policies  can boost 
development within and outside agriculture, but without biasing household decisions about how best to 
invest for the future. 
In many middle income countries the conditions of salaried agricultural work are at least as important 
as the development of small scale farm entrepreneurs. In Chile, for example, two-thirds of all households 
receiving the majority of their income from agricultural sources are salaried workers, not farmers. Labour 
market  policies  have an  important role  in ensuring that  core standards  of  employment  are  met,  while 
improved labour market flexibility has been suggested as a way of reducing informality.  
Social policies 
Many  poor  households,  notably  older  ones,  face  severe  limitations  in  their  adjustment  potential, 
irrespective of the policies that are in place (for example, resource poor and post retirement age farmers). 
Hence there is always a need for social programmes. These policies can lift households out of poverty even 
if they cannot deliver “development”. Investments in human capital (notably education) and measures such 
as  contingent  cash  transfer  can  ensure  that  the  next  generation  makes  a  quantum  leap  in  terms  of 
development. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has pointed to the inevitability of structural change in the agricultural and rural economy, 
the  consequent  pressures  for  adjustment  among  smallholders,  and  the  associated  need  for  policies  to 
facilitate rather than impede that process. A strategic framework has been proposed to assist policymakers 
in choosing the appropriate mix of policy instruments. 
A key premise of that framework is that, for the majority of agriculture-dependent households, the 
long term (i.e. inter-generational) future lies outside the sector. Hence, policies need to make a distinction 
between those who potentially have a competitive future in the sector and those who do not. For both types 
of development path, many of the necessary policies will not be agriculture-specific, so it is important that 
agricultural policies are framed in a broader economy-wide framework. 
Justifications for the use of agricultural market interventions (either in output or input markets) rely 
on second best arguments: they do not provide a theoretically optimal way of providing social protection 
(where social safety nets are to be preferred); nor, in the absence of market failure, are they the ideal way 
of fostering growth, since they treat the symptoms of a lack of development rather than its underlying 
causes. By contrast, the provision of public goods (including investment in agricultural research) is not just 
theoretically superior but of proven value. 
Nevertheless,  plausible  reasons  have  been  advanced  for  why,  given  weak  institutions,  high 
transactions costs and endemic market failures, some agriculture-specific interventions might be desirable. 
For such arguments to be properly substantiated, there needs to be a clear distinction between short-term 
imperatives related to incomes and poverty, and long term development goals, and a recognition that there   19 
may be trade-offs as well as complementarities between the two. For example, input subsidies may have an 
immediate pro-poor impact but ultimately impede agricultural development. 
The strategic framework presented in this paper seeks to help order an analysis of which types of 
policies are most appropriate for smallholder farmers and can contribute to faster progress on MDG1. A 
central conclusion is that it is the policy mix that matters, so empirical analyses of policy effectiveness need 
to take account of further possible complementarities and trade-offs between alternative agricultural and 
non-agricultural  instruments.  The  former  may  include  the  complementarities  between  agricultural 
extension and the development of infrastructure and broader investments in human capital; the latter, the 
opportunity cost of using different expenditure mechanisms (e.g. providing input subsidies versus making 
longer term investments in rural roads or in non-agricultural areas such as health and education). A more 
formal analysis of these linkages is warranted. 
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